Kyiv, July 19th 2022
When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev contributed an essay to the prominent American journal Foreign Affairs in 1959 calling for “peaceful coexistence” between the super powers in order to reduce Cold War tensions, there was someone quick to cut through the cant.
American diplomat George Kennan penned a reply—as Foreign Affair’s current editor, Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, notes in the journal’s recent edition—pointing out that the Soviet Union had expanded its power “at the expense of the freedom of other peoples” and it was in the Soviet Union that adjustment would have to be made to advance the cause of peace. It is exactly this choice the west and others in the international community face in how to confront Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
As the successor state to the ex Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia has inherited and continues the insular and suspicious foreign policy that has defined Russia for centuries. The countries on its periphery—the “near abroad”—are a sphere of influence where Russian supremacy must be respected, or else. The “else” is now what Ukraine is experiencing: war and invasion.
And it is not only Ukraine that faces Russian threat and intimidation. Belorussia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Armenia understand the limits of their own sovereignty as conceived from Moscow. These countries are not free to define their own foreign policy or destiny. And to a degree their domestic policy also—open societies that choose an independent way forward are a threat. The Colour Revolutions of eastern Europe, like those in Ukraine, that saw it slip away from the Russian orbit toward its current, western, focus, are to be stopped.
Far safer for Russia is a style of government in these countries much like its own—authoritarian and oppressive, the state captured by an elite, an oligarchy, that serves itself enjoying the rewards of illiberal, unaccountable, rule. Independent institutions, the law even, can be over ridden. Elections still happen but they are not competitive, the government will not be changed or displaced. Political parties are more for gaining limited participation and consent among conformists and insiders. Otherwise they are avenues for dispensing patronage and parcelling out state rewards.
What next for the west in dealing with Russia? Giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to defend itself is an obvious priority, hoping for it to recapture more of its own territory and eventually reach an agreement with Russia that respects its own sovereignty.
That is a big if. Russia may never give up, despite the horrendous costs; its huge battlefield losses and isolation from the world appear to be acceptable costs for Putin and his people, becoming, what public intellectual Alexander Gabuev—now living in exile—from the Carnegie foundation, says is destined to be a giant Iran.
But containment worked, the Soviet Union, not western capitalism, collapsed due to its own internal contradictions. Strategic patience paid off, and it will again. But at the cost of decades of confrontation.
Russia and Russians will come off the worse for this—isolated from global integration and international investment and business practice, Russia will be a resource economy, even more than it is already. Productivity growth will fall, opportunity will shrink, the economy will stagnate and all the weaknesses that were apparent before will accelerate.
Putin’s securocrats will see this as an acceptable cost—already it strengthens their position. The open and western leaning segment of Russian society who oppose the war and the direction of the country, maybe 20%, are marginalised, have left the country, are planning to do so or are just keeping quiet. Authoritarian regimes are strengthened by economic decline or collapse. Independent wealth, that can think and speak for itself, shrinks; the only game left in town is dependent on state control or state spending.
Where does South Africa and the governing ANC fit in? It is a reactionary party now. It regards people’s power from below as a threat and lumps them together with western imperialism and neoliberalism. It refers to the East European colour revolutions, democratic uprisings, as counter-revolutionary threats and equates them with domestic opposition to its own rule.
In the process the ANC is blind to China and Russia’s own imperialism, the authoritarian nature of how these countries are governed and their relationships with society. It is also out of tune with South Africa’s own pragmatic interests as a developing country. Ideological or alignment with BRICS will only deliver so much. Nearly all of South Africa’s manufactured or value added exports are to western markets. In recent years it has been busy tearing up bilateral trade and investment protection agreements with EU countries and antagonising the US, where AGOA is up for grabs. It took the US under Trump to point out that South Africa’s voting record at the UN was in line with North Korea in opposing American positions. This is not good statesmanship for a developing country navigating its way in the world.