DRC on the downswing
Goma, Nord Kivu January 18th 2011 th
No matter how poor and conflict ridden an African country may be the single issue that makes them more bearable is knowing whether they are on the trajectory to something better through the good policies and actions that will improve whatever its miserable situation may be.
Even in the aftermath of Congo’s civil war and its messy path toward peace and reconstruction in the mid 2000s it used to be possible to take comfort in the knowledge that the country was slowly climbing toward stabilisation and recovery.
As that process gained momentum it finally seemed that a country which has been a byword for corruption and misgovernance on an epic scale was beginning to put in place the policies to take advantage of its many opportunities and allow its people to get ahead. There were successes to keep optimists interested—after the lamentable late president, Laurent Kabila, whose self-inflicted policy disasters sent the country into a tail spin, the economy was on the mend, donor funds and foreign investment returned, social service delivery restarted through a civil service withered by decades of neglect and state collapse. Civil liberties were expanded, a new, liberal, constitution established and democratic elections, the first in 46 years, were held in 2006.
The promise seemed real that a people who have been denied the benefit of democratic freedoms and an open, competently managed, economy, would finally see decisive change in political and economic governance. The detail was untidy and complex, for sure, but it was possible to see the outlines of a relative success story for post-conflict recovery and the chance for something better.
Whether Congo is now still on the path to something better is no longer a question that can be answered unambiguously or without so many caveats as to be practically meaningless. True, there are still signs of progress—the economy is growing, if still not well managed or free of corruption, and the armed conflicts in the east, although not over, are not of the same intensity as before. But the main impression now is of a country on the downswing, regressing toward more familiar ways associated with the corruption, malgovernance and pillage of the Mobutu period, the long serving dictator who oversaw the looting of his own country for decades and fled abroad, leaving a country in ruins, before it was overtaken by the even worse horrors of the ensuing civil and regional wars.
The early hope that post-war Congo was entering a new era of relatively open governance has been disappointed. Instead it today shares many of the same abuses of power, impunity and economic pillage by the state elite that characterise Africa’s worst performing countries. The new president, Joseph Kabila, in power since his Father’s assassination in 2002, when he was bundled into office by panicked presidential cronies, is imposing political control over the state and establishing parallel networks of power. Checks and balances and independent institutions do not exist. Elections, to be held within a year, are to be organised by the government, not the UN; it is inevitable that they will produce victory for the incumbent president.
Effort by the UN and western powers to prod the government toward respect for political pluralism and human rights is brushed off as foreign interference, tapping into local nationalist sentiment and the deep belief among Congolese that many of their problems come from abroad. The UN peace keeping operation, that has at least acted as a neutral arbiter and check on local abuses, is a waning power, on its way out, at local insistence, and whether its departure is within a single year, as now demanded, the direction is clear; soon enough the government will have freedom of maneovere to do as it pleases.
There are serious consequences to such a path—a bad election will deepen, not solve Congo’s problems while politically its recent history has involved regional rebellions in response to local grievances, centralised control and the lack of common interest among former warring parties. The project of national reconciliation which was to follow the peace settlement overseen by the UN has been largely abandoned. Actions to counter corruption or cooperate with war crimes trials with the International Criminal Court are now selective—pretexts to pursue war time enemies and political opponents rather than punishing impunity and serving justice equitably.
It is not hard to find and feel the negative trends in Congo. The corruption is more brazen, the aggression more apparent. It is far more likely these days to be stopped in the street in broad day light by a soldier or a policeman, demanding to see your papers and shake you down. This is not surprising given the example from the top.
Power in Congo, increasingly, is wielded out of sight by unelected and accountable figures. Like in much of Africa there is a huge disconnect between the nominal government and official policies and where real control is actually exercised. Shadowy figures in the presidential circle wield command over state wealth and political power behind the scenes. The moral authority to discourage corrupt behaviour among low ranking officials no longer exists when it is so absent at the highest levels. Increasingly, The Economist notes:
the president and his inner circle are assuming a more prominent role in government decision-making, making their decisions increasingly unpredictable. This is unfortunate for investors, who need regulatory certainty, but also for Congolese who had been hoping that the state would begin to create the conditions for the emergence of a stable middle class.
It is also unfortunate for the country as a whole—predictability and protection from depredation by the state elite are essential components in running a successful market economy that will, over time, lift its own citizens out of poverty.
Economic governance is deteriorating in Congo and foreign investors, invited in to develop the moribund mining, and other sectors, are now the target of shake-downs and state looting. One Canadian mining company, First Quantum, after refusing high level demands for irregular dealings, has had all its mines expropriated and been kicked out of the country without a penny in compensation after spending a decade and over a billion dollars to develop its mines. As a parting shot, it was fined $12bn by a court in Kinshasa for economic crimes. The company’s mines were then given to a 37 year old Israeli businessman, close to the President and to his financial adviser, the sinister Katumba Mwanke, before being sold to oligarchs from Kazakhstan.
First Quantum was no small operator. It was meant to be the poster child for fair treatment to investors invited back in to develop the base metals sector which, from being one of the largest producers in the world in the 1960s, had dwindled to virtually nil under misgovernance, nationalisation and state looting. As the first major mining company to re-enter Congo it received direct investment from the World Bank and South Africa’s regional development bank as part of an effort to catalyze investment and help revive the mining sector. The investment did come, the sector was catalyzed, although this did not save the company from being looted and kicked out.
This is more serious than it sounds and more is at stake than the welfare of foreign investors. Predictability, fairness and the rule of law are necessary conditions for economic growth and poverty reduction. Even some level of corruption is tolerable, if not desirable, for economic development as long as it does not get out of hand enough to interfere with wealth creation altogether. Asia and Latin America have also experienced corruption and crony capitalism during their own rise out of relative poverty. But Congo—and much of Africa—has never managed that balance; too often the line has shifted from affordable palm greasing to more explicitly rapacious behaviour—the looting and destruction of whole economic sectors by the political elite. As a result, a country with such a rich endowment in natural resources as to practically be a freak of nature, remains mired in poverty and dysfunction—the poorest country in the world.
The belief that with the end of the war Congo would now be on the path to minimally clean government is a fast fading hope. The break with the past will not happen. Instead, the unique and ugly fate of Congo and the Congolese, together with frustrated donors and foreign well wishers, is to minimise abuses where possible and make whatever gains that can be made. Taking a tougher line as a donor in charge of aid disbursements may not change corrupt behaviour, and could fuel isolation and punish the country’s citizens. Not doing enough will enable impunity and let corrupt elites off the hook. Difficult choices and bad consequences which ever way you look—what way forward Congo and the Congolese?